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The Royal College of Physicians of London published the 2013 national clinical guidelines on prolonged disorders
of consciousness (PDOC) in vegetative and minimally conscious states. The guidelines acknowledge the rapidly
advancing neuroscientific research and evolving therapeutic modalities in PDOC. However, the guidelines state that
end-of-life decisions should be made for patients who do not improve with neurorehabilitation within a finite
period, and they recommend withdrawal of clinically assisted nutrition and hydration (CANH). This withdrawal is
deemed necessary because patients in PDOC can survive for years with continuation of CANH, even when a ceiling
on medical care has been imposed, i.e., withholding new treatment such as cardiopulmonary resuscitation for acute
life-threatening illness. The end-of-life care pathway is centered on a staged escalation of medications, including
sedatives, opioids, barbiturates, and general anesthesia, concurrent with withdrawal of CANH. Agitation and distress
may last from several days to weeks because of the slow dying process from starvation and dehydration. The potential
problems of this end-of-life care pathway are similar to those of the Liverpool Care Pathway. After an independent
review in 2013, the Department of Health discontinued the Liverpool Care pathway in England. The guidelines assert
that clinicians, supported by court decisions, have become the final authority in nonconsensual withdrawal of
CANH on the basis of “best interests” rationale. We posit that these guidelines lack high-quality evidence supporting:
1) treatment futility of CANH, 2) reliability of distress assessment from starvation and dehydration, 3) efficacy of
pharmacologic control of this distress, and 4) proximate causation of death. Finally, we express concerns
about the utilitarian-based assessment of what constitutes a person’s best interests. We are disturbed by the
level and the role of medical authoritarianism institutionalized by these national guidelines when deciding on
the worthiness of life in PDOC. We conclude that these guidelines are not only harmful to patients and families,
but they represent the means of nonconsensual euthanasia. The latter would constitute a gross violation of the public’s
trust in the integrity of the medical profession.
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The Royal College of Physicians (RCP) of London
published national clinical guidelines on prolonged dis-
orders of consciousness (PDOC) in 2013 to standardize
the approach to diagnosis, management, and end-of-life
care (EOLC) for 2 specific neurologic disorders: vege-
tative and minimally conscious states [1]. Jennett and
Plum [2] introduced the term vegetative based on the
assumption that the remaining neurologic processing is
limited to only the brainstem. Forty years later, higher
cortical neurologic processing is widely acknowledged toentral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public
mons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this
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tive state. Therefore, this phrase has been replaced in
the neuroscientific literature with a more scientifically
precise descriptor, unresponsive wakefulness syndrome
[3]. The persistent use of vegetative in the medical
literature may reflect a fundamental misunderstanding
of this neurologic disorder or perhaps connote an in-
dignity to persons with development of this neurologic
disability.
Refusal of nutrition and fluid by competent adults is a
legal method of suicide and assisted death [4]. Adminis-
tration of nutrition and hydration, even by artificial
means, is considered by many authors to be standard
care rather than medical treatment [5-15]. Denton et al.
have made the argument along a physiological line of
reasoning that nutrition and hydration alleviate natural
responses of hunger and thirst which are primordial
emotions of evolutionary origin in human consciousness
[16]. However, the RCP national guidelines [1] use the
term clinically assisted nutrition and hydration (CANH)
to emphasize that the assistance should be considered a
medical treatment rather than a basic compassionate
care service rendered to disabled persons. Patients in
PDOC lack decision-making capacity and cannot
provide first-person consent for a life-ending inter-
vention such as stopping nutrition and hydration.
These patients can survive for years with CANH,
even if a “ceiling of care” is implemented, i.e., with-
holding new interventions for acute life-threatening
illness such as infections, thromboembolism or acute
cardiopulmonary arrest (p. 70) [1]. If patients in
PDOC do not improve with neurorehabilitation, the
treating clinicians can authorize cessation of nutrition
and hydration. CANH is withdrawn based on theTable 1 National guidelines for the Staged Escalation of phar
of nutrition and hydration in prolonged disorders of consciou
Stage 1: Continuous IV infusion
of benzodiazepines and opioids
Medications are best loaded in separat
optimum regimen is established. Set u
(10 mg/24 h) and morphine (10 mg/2
pump. Adjust the infusion dose accord
10–20 mg/h; morphine, 10 mg/h). How
the maximum benefit from these drug
Stage 2: Continuous IV infusion
of neuroleptics
Continue the current doses of morphi
with levomepromazine (50 mg/24 h). P
if no effect is seen from bolus doses, p
Stage 3: Continuous IV infusion
of barbiturates
Continue morphine and midazolam at
Replace with phenobarbitone (600 mg
(100–200 mg) IV bolus doses. If not res
Stage 4: General (self-ventilating)
anesthesia
In very rare cases, severe physiologic dis
should be administered with the suppo
Abbreviations: ITU intensive therapy unit, IV intravenous.
Reproduced from: Royal College of Physicians. Prolonged disorders of consciousnes
Royal College of Physicians. Reproduced with permission.
aThe table illustrates the staged escalation of benzodiazepines, opioids, neuroleptic
of nutrition and hydration in prolonged disorders of consciousness.determination of treatment futility and unacceptable
quality of life. The guidelines apply the “best inter-
ests” rationale when justifying nonconsensual with-
drawal of CANH.
This commentary focuses on the medical and ethical
issues preempting nonconsensual withdrawal of CANH
and the use of a preferred end-of-life care (EOLC) path-
way (Table 1) [1]. The EOLC pathway is centered on a
staged escalation of medications, including sedatives,
opioids, barbiturates, and general anesthesia, and it has
the same problems as those reported with the Liverpool
Care Pathway [17]. The Department of Health has
discontinued the Liverpool Care Pathway in England
after an independent review in 2013 [18]. We question
the validity of treatment futility of CANH on the basis
of several factors: 1) the contemporary knowledge gap
about the timeline for recovery in PDOC, 2) the patho-
physiology of distress from dehydration, 3) the efficacy
of administered medications in managing this distress,
and 4) the proximate cause of death from lethal effects
of these medications. We also address the predominantly
utilitarian interpretation of best interests in the justifica-
tion of nonconsensual and terminal withdrawal of
CANH in PDOC.
Knowledge gap in the understanding of disorders
of consciousness
Advances in neuroimaging and neuroelectrophysiologic
monitoring have unmasked a large knowledge gap in
the contemporary understanding of consciousness [19].
Neuroscientific knowledge of the interrelationship between
the level and the content of consciousness (i.e., responsive-
ness and awareness, respectively) in different pathophys-
iologic and pharmacologic states continues to evolvemacologic management of distress from the withdrawal
snessa
e syringe drivers so that they can be varied independently until the
p 2 IV syringe drivers and commence IV infusion with midazolam
4 h). Prescribe bolus IV doses of each drug to be given by the syringe
ing to the frequency of bolus doses required (midazolam, up to
ever, if no effect is seen from bolus doses, the patient is receiving
s. Progress to stage 2.
ne and midazolam in 1 IV syringe driver. Set up a second syringe driver
rescribe bolus IV doses of levomepromazine (12.5-25 mg). However,
rogress to stage 3.
current dose in first continuous IV infusion. Stop levomepromazine.
/d) in a second continuous IV infusion. Prescribe phenobarbitone
ponding to bolus doses, proceed to stage 4.
tress with terminal agitation may require self-ventilating IV anaesthesia. This
rt of ITU-trained staff under the supervision of a consultant anaesthetist.
s: National clinical guidelines. London: RCP, 2013 (p. 84) [1]. Copyright © 2013
s, and general anesthesia in the end-of-life care pathway after the withdrawal
Figure 1 The interrelationship between the level and the content of consciousness in different pathophysiologic and pharmacologic
states. Contemporary advances in neuroscience have unmasked a wide knowledge gap in the neurophysiologic characterization of human
consciousness. The level of consciousness is generally assessed by either wakefulness or responsiveness to external stimuli. The content of
consciousness includes internal (self) and external (environmental) awareness. The content of consciousness is difficult to assess in unresponsive
and noncommunicative patients (e.g., coma or general anesthesia settings). The temporal pattern of recovery in neuronal networks that mediate
the content of consciousness in the severely injured human brain has not been completely elucidated. Adapted from Laureys [20] with
permission of the publisher Elsevier Ltd.
Rady and Verheijde Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2014, 9:16 Page 3 of 8
http://www.peh-med.com/content/9/1/16(Figure 1) [20-23]. Functional neuroimaging and neu-
rophysiologic studies of the injured human brain suggest
remarkable plasticity of neural connectivity and networks
involved in external and internal awareness [24,25]. This
also highlights the potential for recovery and retention of
awareness, in spite of extensive brain injury [19]. However,
the optimal neurotherapeutic modalities and timelines for
recovery of awareness and responsiveness in PDOC have
not been fully characterized and continue to evolve with
new advances in neuroscience [26].
The RCP guidelines set an arbitrary time limit of 4 weeks
to 6 months for making end-of-life decisions in PDOC
(p. 77) [1]. End-of-life decisions are made on the basis of
a clinical assessment showing lack of improvement despite
neurorehabilitation. This assessment is generally limited
to a bedside neurologic examination and may not include
sensitive tools for assessing awareness such as functional
neuroimaging and neurophysiologic studies [24,25]. When
end-of-life decisions are made prematurely because of per-
vasive “therapeutic nihilism”, this becomes a self-fulfilling
prophecy for poor patient outcomes [27].
Pathophysiology of life-ending starvation and
dehydration
The RCP guidelines delineate some of the symptoms in-
duced by prolonged starvation and dehydration: “[t]he
consequence of treatment withdrawal would be death by
dehydration and nutritional deprivation with the patientpossibly experiencing (i) thirst, (ii) hunger, (iii) discom-
fort, (v) [sic] distress, and (vi) pain for a 2–3 week period”
(p. 78) [1]. The distress includes agitation, sweating, and
“spontaneous and reflex movements such as roving eye
movements, groaning, crying, teeth-grinding, chewing etc.
which may become more pronounced” (p. 80) [1].
The guidelines claim that the intention of withdrawing
CANH is to avoid inflicting additional suffering. However,
we posit that the guidelines downplay the distress and
suffering from intentional starvation and dehydration
by asserting that the benefits of withdrawal outweigh the
associated short-term harm. In clinical practice, it is gen-
erally accepted that CANH is unlikely to cause pain or
suffering unless patients are intolerant of enteral feeding
because of abdominal distention, vomiting, or fluid over-
load. Most patients in PDOC are unlikely to be intolerant
of nutrition and hydration. In fact, the literature suggests
(and most families agree) that nutrition and hydration are
considered basic compassionate care because they pro-
mote physical and emotional well-being [10,28,29].
Withdrawal of CANH has biologic consequences [30].
The lethal pathophysiology of intentional dehydration
includes onset of acute kidney failure and cardiovascular
collapse. However, this dying process is slow and can last
days to weeks. The physiologic responses to starvation
and dehydration in the dying process also diminish the
efficacy of analgesics and sedatives in controlling distress-
ful symptoms [31,32]. Furthermore, the adverse effects of
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hallucination, hyperalgesia, seizure, paralytic ileus, cardio-
respiratory depression, etc.) are potentiated by dehydra-
tion [30]. Optimal pharmacologic control of these
symptoms becomes clinically challenging in the last
few days of life. Indeed, the guidelines resort to using
barbiturates and general anesthesia to control refractory
distress in the final days before death (Table 1).
The neurologic consequences of withdrawal of CANH
also are not completely appreciated. Without appropri-
ate neuromonitoring, bedside clinical assessment cannot
easily determine awareness of internal and external nox-
ious stimuli. Patients who are rendered pharmacologic-
ally unresponsive with general anesthesia retain primary
sensory processing of noxious stimuli [33]. Awareness of
primordial affective responses to thirst, hunger, and pain
are normally mediated through higher and lower brain
structures [16]. These affective responses are intensified
in PDOC [34]. Although the guidelines recognize that
higher neurologic processing of noxious stimuli from
prolonged starvation and dehydration can produce phys-
ical signs “e.g., grimacing, moaning, etc.” (pg. 60) [1],
they do not emphasize that absent signs do not exclude
central nociception or affective distress.
Efficacy of sedation in managing distress of
dehydration
Sedatives and opioids are administered preemptively to
manage distress after the withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment [35]. These medications can be used to induce
and maintain continuous deep sedation until death [31].
Continuous deep sedation until death is also used as an al-
ternative to active euthanasia [36-41]. The RCP guidelines
prescribe a pharmacologic protocol for managing the dis-
tress induced by starvation and dehydration (Table 1). The
protocol is centered on the delivery of escalating doses
of midazolam and morphine by continuous subcutane-
ous or intravenous infusion, with no proportionality
in dose titration: “[n]ever decrease the background in-
fusion dose, even when symptoms/signs appear to be
well controlled” (p.82) [1]. However, dehydration alters
the pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamics of midazo-
lam and morphine that are administered by continuous
infusion. Accumulation of metabolites of both medica-
tions is lethal and causes cardiorespiratory arrest and
death. A continuous infusion of barbiturates is a potent
depressant of vital functions of the central respiratory
center and the cardiovascular system. For the same
reason, these medications can be administered rapidly
as a bolus injection rather than by slow continuous
infusion in active euthanasia and execution by lethal in-
jection [42]. The RCP guidelines recommend general
anesthesia to be administered in some cases “under
the supervision of a consultant anaesthetist” (p. 84)[1]. The administration of general anesthesia without
cardiopulmonary support is inconsistent with the stand-
ard of practice by anesthetists since “their actions could be
construed as an act of euthanasia or assisted suicide as
they would be initiating cardiopulmonary compromise
and yet be unable to treat this once it had occurred” [em-
phasis added] [43].
The guidelines’ recommended pharmacologic protocol
has not been validated in well-designed controlled clinical
trials to ascertain its palliative efficacy in patients who are
dying from prolonged starvation and dehydration. Au-
thors of a Cochrane review expressed concerns regarding
the safety of EOLC pathways that are formulated by opin-
ions and without supporting high-quality evidence [44].
The implementation of this pathway in clinical practice
can have harmful outcomes on dying patients, families,
and health care providers and professionals [18,45-47]. A
minimal standard is required in the formulation of safe
and trustworthy national and international clinical prac-
tice guidelines [48]. The strength of evidence supporting a
specific recommendation and the adaptability to an indi-
vidual patient’s care goals, values, and preferences are re-
quired elements to ensure the guidelines are deserving of
the public’s trust [49]. Notably, European palliative care
experts consider sedation for intentional starvation and
dehydration as euthanasia, not palliative care [50]. The
World Health Organization describes palliative care as
“relief from pain and other distressing symptoms” [51].
No high-quality evidence substantiates the efficacy of opi-
oids and sedatives to control the distress associated with
starvation and dehydration. Lacking such evidence, the
withdrawal of CANH should not be considered palliative
care in PDOC.
Cause of death
The newly established guidelines state that “the principal
process in the death is multi-organ failure from dehydra-
tion” (p.80) [1]. The proximate cause of cessation of vital
signs is dehydration and the lethal cardiovascular and re-
spiratory effects of the administered medications [31].
However, the guidelines recommend “[w]hen drawing up
a death certificate after withdrawal of CANH, the ori-
ginal brain injury should be given as the primary cause
of death” (p.84) [1]. Selecting the original brain injury as
the primary or proximate cause of death provides legal
sanctuary for clinicians who participate in the withdrawal
of CANH. However, the discordance between the proxim-
ate cause of death and the official cause listed on the death
certificate also could be interpreted as an infringement on
the long-held assumption in society and law that the med-
ical profession holds truthfulness as one of its highest
moral priorities.
The UK courts have avoided adjudicating if noncon-
sensual withdrawal of treatment and administration of
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ten death is homicide [52]. Indeed, withdrawal of CANH
fulfills two elements of homicide as outlined by South
African Law Professor McQuoid-Mason [52]. He quotes
from ‘Mason and McCall Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics’
that “[t]he courts in the UK ‘have been anxious to ensure
that the cause of death was attributed to natural disease in
all these cases of nonvoluntary assistance in dying [53]”.
Firstly,”… ‘[e]ventual intention’ occurs where a person
does not mean to kill a person but subjectively foresees
the possibility of death because of their conduct and pro-
ceeds with such conduct” [52]. The eventual intention of
withdrawing CANH is death. Secondly, “[l]egal causation
occurs where the act or omission that caused the death is
either a foreseeable or a direct cause of the person’s death.
The foreseeability approach holds that if a person in the
position of the perpetrator would have reasonably fore-
seen the likelihood of death and persisted with their act or
omission, then the perpetrator legally caused the death of
the deceased.…. The direct consequence approach holds
that the perpetrator is liable unless some new act inter-
venes between the original act or omission that resulted in
the ultimate death of the deceased… The victim’s pre-
existing physical susceptibilities are not regarded as a new
intervening act” [52]. Therefore, the preexisting physical
disability in PDOC does not negate that the act of with-
drawal of CANH is the proximate cause of death.
The Utilitarian “Best Interests”
The RCP guidelines apply the best-interests standard in
the justification of nonconsensual withdrawal of CANH
after considering 3 pertinent issues: 1) the suffering in-
duced by dehydration, 2) the cause of death, and 3) the
value of human life. As we have outlined above, the
guidelines fail to provide high-quality evidence that
the pharmacologic interventions will consistently and ef-
fectively control distress from dehydration lasting for days
to weeks. We have also argued that the proximate cause
of death is dehydration and lethal effects of the adminis-
tered medications. Finally, in what follows, we address how
the guidelines transform best interests to justify noncon-
sensual life-ending withdrawal of CANH.
The guidelines do not consider the sanctity of human
life as an absolute principle in law and perhaps in society
at large: “[a]lthough the fundamental principle of law is
the sanctity of human life, this is not an absolute principle.
Life does not have to be prolonged regardless of circum-
stances” (p.62) [1]. The standard of best interests is ap-
plied in the determination of the value of a human life.
The guidelines equate the value of life with quality of life,
e.g., patients in PDOC without demonstrated neurologic
improvement after a predefined period of neurorehabilita-
tion have lives considered unworthy of prolonging: 1) “[b]
est interests are not restricted purely to medicalconsiderations, nor do they necessarily mean the pro-
longation of life” (p. 54); 2) “A formal best interests deci-
sion meeting should normally be held at least within
4 weeks after the onset of PDOC” (p. 58); and 3) “Once it
is known that a patient is in a permanent VS [vegetative
state], further treatment is considered futile. Processes to
consider withdrawal of life-sustaining treatments, includ-
ing CANH, should begin on the basis of their best inter-
ests, and in discussion with the family” (p. 76) [1].
The guidelines outline the balance of benefits and bur-
dens of CANH (p. 78) [1]. The benefit of CANH is
maintaining wellbeing through nutrition and hydration,
continuation of life, and future improvement in the quality
of life. The burdens of CANH include “potentially nega-
tive aspects of continuing life from physical or emotional
discomfort from neurorehabilitation, pain or discomfort
from frequent replacement of feeding tubes, vomiting,
aspiration, lack of dignity, etc.” (p. 78) [1]. The guide-
lines then conclude that the burdens outweigh the bene-
fits and determine that CANH is a futile treatment in
PDOC and should be withdrawn based on best-interests
considerations.
Surveys of families of patients in PDOC indicate that a
significant number of them would object to withdrawing
CANH [54,55]. Most families consider death by starva-
tion and dehydration an “inhumane” [54] and “utterly
abhorrent” [55] practice. Those families do not consider
CANH futile because it is physiologically effective in
maintaining nutrition and hydration for their loved ones.
Anticipating the potential for familial refusal to life-
ending withdrawal of CANH, the guidelines provide a
roadmap of how to overcome this barrier: “[i]t should be
made clear that a decision made in a person’s ‘best inter-
ests’ is not necessarily the same as the whole family be-
ing happy about a particular decision (for example, a
family cannot easily be expected to say that they ‘want’
or ‘are happy’ to allow death)” (p. 57) [1].
Clinicians are authorized to withdraw CANH after an
assessment and judgment of the patient’s best interests:
“the responsible senior clinician has ultimate responsibil-
ity for healthcare decision-making based on judgement
of what is in the patient’s best interests, taking into ac-
count what the patient would want if they could express a
view” (p. 56) [1]. However, if treating clinicians object to
the withdrawal of CANH, then the guidelines classify this
objection as “conscientious objection” that “may not, of
course, be well informed”, (p. 65) [1]. Objecting clinicians
are to be replaced by clinicians who will carry out this de-
cision: “[h]owever, if the individual clinician could not
sanction best interests decision in one direction, they
should hand over the care of the patient to a clinician who
can” (p. 66) [1]. The default direction in best interests
is the withdrawal of CANH. Finally, the Court system
may be involved to sanction life-ending withdrawal of
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between the treating team, the family, and the respon-
sible commissioning health body to decide whether it
is appropriate to make an application to the Court for
withdrawal of CANH, based on the balance of best inter-
ests, considering the benefits and burdens of continued
treatment” (p. 79) [1].
The guidelines expect the legal system to concur with
clinicians’ interpretation of best interests and proceed
with nonconsensual withdrawal of CANH. The legal
system can also trump objections to withdrawal by a
Health and Welfare Lasting Power of Attorney or a
Court-appointed Welfare Deputy. The guidelines point
out that the court has ruled in Airedale NHS Trust v
Bland [1993] AC 789 (HL) to authorize the withdrawal of
CANH in vegetative states. The ruling asserts that nutri-
tion and hydration are to be considered treatment rather
than a basic compassionate care service. However, in the
case of Bland (who was in a vegetative state), his family
considered him to be already “dead” and requested with-
drawal of CANH [56]. Therefore, withdrawal of CANH
did not need to be invoked unilaterally by either clinicians
or the court.
The guidelines appear to extrapolate this court ruling as
an endorsement of nonconsensual withdrawal of CANH
in all patients with a similar diagnosis. This example of
medical authoritarianism should be troubling to both the
majority of the medical community and to the general
public. Special-interests groups have used the legal system
to legitimize the controversial utilitarian practice of eu-
thanasia, a practice that many believe violates traditional
values of medicine and society [57]. Indeed, some mem-
bers of the RCP working party, who developed the guide-
lines, have already called for active euthanasia of patients
in permanent vegetative state [58]. Life-ending starvation
and dehydration is becoming a common practice as an
alternative to euthanasia by lethal injection in several
European countries [12,14,59]. The Council of Europe
has also endorsed the practice in EOLC guidelines
[60]. This unconditional endorsement is inconsistent
with the obligation of protecting rights of the vulner-
able and incapacitated individuals in society. It raises
the question —is society willing to sanction clinicians
terminating “life that is unworthy of living” under the
pretext of relieving societal burden and best interests?
Conclusions
The national guidelines’ recommendation of life-ending
withdrawal of nutrition and hydration after a finite time
and implementation of staged escalation of potentially
lethal medications in PDOC is not supported by high-
quality evidence and is likely to harm patients and fam-
ilies. The utilitarian legal interpretation of best interests
to sanction nonconsensual withdrawal of CANH riskspaving the way to embracing nonconsensual euthanasia
in medicine and society.
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